Lexis and Culture:  Bound and Determined?

 

 

Gregory Hadley

hadley@nuis.ac.jp

 

 

"Kuchi wa wazawai no moto"

"The mouth is the source of disaster"

- Japanese Proverb

 

1.0  Introduction

Recently Deignan, Knowles, Willis and Sinclair (1995) stated that " . . . a speak­er is, to a certain extent, bound by the lexis of his/her language in the range of meanings he/she can ex­press . . . especially when there does not seem to be a neutral term avail­able" (p. 37).  This type of assertion, strongly influenced by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is generally accepted by many trained linguists, researchers, and teachers alike (cf. Sharwood Smith 1988, Matsumoto 1989).  The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, (also known as the Whorfian hypothesis) asserts that it is the lexis of a particular language that shapes or limits in some way the cogni­tion and expression of a particular society.   The influence that words exert on society supposedly makes it distinct from any other culture or language group. 

 

Scovel (1991) rightly points out that, while the Whorfian hypoth­esis continues to be popular, it has yet to be validified by either quantitative or qualitative research.  This prompts us to ask the question:  Are speakers truly limited in the range of meaning for a lexical item in his or her language, especially when there is no parallel neutral term?  When in doubt, we should at least be open to other ways of describing psycholinguisitic processes in lexical fields.  The basic premise of this paper will be to offer an alternate view -- that cultural proto­types, rather than lexis, shape a society's world view.            


We will lay the foundation necessary to contemplate this premise first by looking at some basic concepts from the work on lexicon, and lexical acquisition research, as well as drawing upon current theories in psycholinguistics.  Lexical items from Japanese, Spanish and North American English will be used as living exam­ples of cultural prototypes.  In answer to pragmatic concerns,  this paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications our discussion has for teaching. 

 

2.0  Basic Definitions

What do we mean when we say "word" or "lexis"?  Linguists have a hard time delineating these concepts, since both common-sensical orthographic and technical descriptions fail to completely define what words are.  Instead, they have found it easier to describe the functions of words.  Words are polysemous.  That is to say, words having the same orthographic form can have multiple mean­ings.  Words also can be homonymous, meaning that words of dif­ferent meanings can have the same orthographic form.  Words are denotative, which McCarthy (1994:16) interprets as the real world meaning of a word, and/or connotative, which is the meaning that mingles with the emotional content associated with the word.  Denotation and connotation will figure prominently in our reflec­tion on lexis and culture. 

 

"Word" is obviously the subject of a very complex philosophical debate.  However, for simplification, in this paper we will follow Carter's (1992) lead by using the term word when there is no need to be exact, but the terms lexis or lexical item as " . . . a neutral hold-all term which captures and, to some extent, helps to overcome the instabilities in the term word, especially when it becomes limited by orthography" (p. 7).  Lexis and lexi­cal item are handy all-encompassing terms that will include but not be limited to items such as fixed phrases, idioms and meta­phorical extensions.  The justification for this procedure will be explained later, and is significant to the argument of this paper, and for second language teaching implications. 

 

2.1  Lexical Acquisition Research:  An Overview

Much of the research in lexical acquisition has been with the L1 acquisition process of children.  Some might have doubts about whether such research is applicable to L2 acquisition, but many re­searchers (cf. Fromkin, 1980; Cutler and Fay, 1982; Channell, 1988) feel the acquisition processes of the L1 and L2 are sufficiently linked together to make at least general inferences from L1 onto L2 acquisition.  Also, while recognizing the contri­butions that Krashen (1981) has made to our understanding of the terms "learning" and "acquisition", for the sake of simplicity we will use the terms interchangeably.    

 

Clark's (1973) Feature Acquisition Hypothesis says that children acquire lexis through describing the aspects of an object.  For example, ice would be understood by a child as cold, wet, and possibly glass-like; not hot, dry and sweet.  According to this hypothesis, children might overextend their understanding of lexis and mislabel other objects with similar aspects.  A child, after being exposed to the word fly, may then overextend the word to a bird or an airplane.  Nelson (1974) felt that children learn words not by their static aspects, but by interacting with the objects itself.  Her Functional Core Concept asserts that what a child does with the object is more important that what the object is.  It is through playing with an object that a child eventually acquires words.  

 

However, Bowerman's (1978) research suggests that features and functions are included in the learning of a word for a child, but that they are part of a developing set of proto­types. ­ These "semantic prototypes" change ­­and grow through time until the child can develop more defined prototypes that will fit into a larger and more sophisticated mental lexicon.  This process of growth was described in Anglin's (1970) research.  Anglin showed how his subjects mental lexicon shifted from a syntagmatic to a more paradigmatic understanding.  The subjects over the years also showed a steady progression from a concrete to an ab­stract comprehension of words.  And in the process of learning new vocabulary, Bolinger (1976) found that children often learn lexis in chunks, relying heavily on fixed, idiomatic and deistic ex­pressions.  Crossing over to L2 research, Meara (1982) found that L2 learners also go through various stages of lexical instabili­ties, much like young L1 learners.  Johnston (1985) also has identified at least six progressive stages in L2 lexical acquisi­tion.  But the acquisition of lexis and progression through these stages seems to move more quickly for learner when they learn the lexical items in context.  Craik and Lockhart (1972) found that deeper mental processing takes place when students are given vocabulary tasks that require them to think deeply about the form of the words they are studying.  The implications of Meara's (1984) later works seem to show that L2 learners develop more complex prototypes while their knowledge of the form of lexical items grow. 

 

All these findings offer us some interesting insights on the L2 acquisition process.  However, Nunan (1989) warns that many findings in such research were uncovered in laboratories rather than classrooms, and often under limited circumstances.  So while we should not close the door in looking for ways to utilize the insights gained from L1 and L2 acquisition re­searchers, our application of their findings must be carried out with an appro­priate amount of caution.  

 

2.2  Word Knowledge

What do we mean when we say a person knows a word?  Is it the memorization of the definition of the lexical item, or the abil­ity to use the word in context?  Linguists would say both and more is required to know a word.  Carter (1992) feels that know­ing a word " . . . involves knowing how to use the word syntactically, semantically and pragmatically or discoursally" (p. 174).  McCarthy (1994) and Carter (1992) also state that to know a word involves mastering it's syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations.  Syntagmatic relations involve words joining to make larger blocks of text.  Paradigmatic relations deal with how each word consists of a choice from several words that have similar, but not necessarily exact, meanings.  Actually knowing a lexical item is a perplexing process for second language learners, espe­cially when it comes to comprehending the vast range of meaning and the connotation that word may have for a culture. 

 

How then can one know the meaning of a lexical item?  There are two main schools of thought concerning word meaning.  One group, called structural semanticists, is represented by such scholars as Carter and McCarthy.  Aitchison (1995) calls the other group the fuzzy-meaning adherents (p. 40).

 

2.3  Structural Semantics and Core Vocabulary

Carter (1992) describes the approach of structural semanticists by saying that " . . . words do not exist in isolation:  their meanings are defined through sense relations they have with other words" (p. 18).  Central to the semanticist view is the idea of core vocabulary.  Carter (1992) defines core vocabulary as the most basic words in a language.  Quirk (1982:43) asserts core vocabulary bears no marks of culture, or as he puts it, " . . . as culture-free as calculus, with no literary, aesthetic or emotional aspirations" (p. 43).  Core words are also said to be neutral with respect to field and tenor of discourse (Carter 1992:41-42).  These and other lexical items are stored in a cognitive framework called the mental lexicon.  Within it are semantic fields and lexical fields.  McCarthy (1994) defines these terms in the following way:

 

"These lexical fields are the realization (or flesh and bones, as it were) of the abstract notion of semantic fields . . . Semantic fields contain only concepts; lexical fields contain real words" (p. 21). 

 

In this sense, Food might be considered a semantic field, and below it another semantic field of fruit.  Under this would be the lexical field of apple, banana, orange, etc.  However, an item such as tomato, which is actually a fruit, is not normally included in this set.  One's mental image of a lexical item seems to have something to do with what field in which it is mentally lexicalized.  Carter (1992) quietly mentions the weakness of only looking at the structures of the mental lexicon by stating:

 

". . . there is no such thing as an inherently neutral item, but that in most contexts and in a taxonomy such as this, dog is the more usually neutral specification.  This allows us to observe in a relatively systematic way that the more under-or overspecific an item, the more immediate the commu­nication and the more marked the evaluative overtones pro­duced by the use of the item" (p. 85) 

 

 

While lexis can be designated in structures, Carter implies that meani­ng can still evade us.  Not only that, but cultural neutral­ity in core words is at best, relative.  Besides this, Lyons (1977, 305-11) says that semantic and lexical fields are uniquely arranged from culture to culture. 

 

McCarthy (1994:47) and Langac­ker (1987­:155) feel that one way to better understand the process at work in these different lexical fields is through the Schema Theory.  This psycholinguistic theory, which is loosely based upon Aristotlean philosophy states that words are  symbolic keys to mental knowledge, and because of this, words will  process different images (or schemata) and feelings depending upon the culture.    

 

We can see now that the structural semanticists provide an impor­tant piece of the puzzle in our quest for a more coherent picture in what happens with lexis, meaning and culture.  However, psycholinguists can also participate with their insights on mental images and cultural schematic representations.  At this point, it is significant to realize the virtual nonexistence of neutral terms, core or otherwise, in a language.  This will be further explained when looking at Japanese core vocabulary.   


2.4  The Prototype Theory

Aitchison (1995) presents a psycholingual viewpoint, which says that word meanings are abstract.  She focuses on how our affec­tive mental images of lexical items are more important than what we cognitively perceive as reality:

 

"Word meanings cannot be pinned down, as if they were dead insects.  Instead, they flutter around elusively like live butterflies.  Or perhaps they should be likened to fish which slither out of one's grasp" (p. 39-40). 

 

While she agrees that some words are more basic (core) in meaning than others, lexical meaning, according to this point of view, is found in prototypes.  Closely related to the Schema theory,  Aitchison (1995) defines a prototype as " . . . mental models of the world which we live in, models which are private and cultural architectures, and only partially in touch with 'reality'" (p. 70)  Instead of thinking merely of structure which contain core words or other lexical items, according to the prototype theory, the mental lexicon contains vague pictures of the words.  While there are many strengths in this theory, especially around the problems of polysemy,  Aitchi­son (1995) admits to its inconsis­tencies, writing:  "...the more closely prototypes are examined, the more elusive they seem to be" (p. 64).     

 

3.0  Is Lexis Limited?

We can now return to the assertion made at the beginning of this paper.  Are speakers limited to the range of meaning they can ascribe to a lexical item?  A main skill we have as speakers entails the ability to use the figurative meanings of a word.  Metaphor allows us to use lexis in more creative ways than just the basic meaning.  For example 'la mano' in Spanish means 'hand' in English, and often carries a meaning of someone or something that demonstrates ability (or the lack thereof).  For example:  'Cargó la mano' (He really laid it on thick), 'Se me fue la mano' (I got carried away), 'La medicina fue mano de santo', (The medicine was like a saint's hand -- The medicine worked wonders).  McCarthy (1994) calls this a word's metaphorical extension, which is based upon the word's central meaning: 

 

"This view of polysemy is creative; it leaves open the possibility of new metaphorical extensions of the central meaning . . . [this] is not a fringe aspect of language; it is at the very heart of word meaning and affects the vast majority of words" (p. 25-26). 

 

He continues by explaining the differences between conven­tional metaphors (metaphors most native speakers have heard or used themselves) and unconven­tional metaphors (highly cre­ative, uncom­mon uses of language).  Atchison (1995:71-2) would call the conventional metaphors part of fixed mental models, and the unconventional ones temporary models; the fluid structures set up at a moment's notice to express something in a novel way.

 

It is the unconven­tional metaphor, the temporary model, which is at the forefront of word meaning.  Al­though some (see Carter, 1992:­119) would consider unconv­en­tional metaphors a deviant usage of lexis, this form of metaphor insure that potential meanings of lexical items will be limited only by creativity of those wield­ing the lan­guage.

 

It will be found, however, that the range of acceptability in a metaphor will become in­creasingly limited as it becomes more unconventional.  Eventually the language can become incoherent.  McInto­sh (1966:­19­3) touch­es upon this by discussing the tension between normal collocations and grammar and unusual collocations and grammar.  He feels that the range of tolerabili­ty between collocations and other lexical items (such as metaphor) is rela­tive.  Extension of lexical items are certainly possible, as we can see in new words such as software, rightsizing or outsour­cing.

As the illustration shows, evidently the higher a lexical item is metaphorically extended, the less chance it will be under­stood by most encoders.  The question mark symbolizes an area of meta­phor or cre­ative colloca­tion that may only be under­stood by the speak­er.  However, to­day's maker of incoherent metaphor may become tomorrow's literary genius in art, philosophy, or other esoteric disci­plines. From there the item can move further down the cline and be accessed by larger numbers of encoders, to the point where it can become a conventional metaphor.  For example, the Zen Buddhist metaphor of "the sound of one hand clapping" was incoherent when it first arrived to the West some years ago.  Now it has become almost conventional in marked usage.  The following tanka by poet Sanford Goldstein further illustrates the point that lexical manipulation is rela­tive and, especially with  plann­ed texts such as in literature, metaphorical extension can be quite unusual, yet perfectly ac­ceptable:

 

                                                            how set

                                                            this cylinder of rice

                                                            rolled with seaweed-

                                                            I bite into memory

                                                            I samurai my coffee cup

 

Practically speaking, most lexical usage will stay near the bottom of the illustration.  However, as we can clear­ly see, the potential range of lexical meaning is virtually boundless, or at least is much freer in terms of expression than most speakers realize. 

 

4.0   Lexical Connotation and Culture

We will now move on to discuss my basic premise, that the conno­tation of lexical items is influenced by the prototypes of the dominant culture, rather than the culture being affected by lexis.  Carter (1992) represents the current mainstream by saying that, at least with neutral core vocabulary, the culture is affected by these lexis.  But it seems a difficult task to find truly neutral and cultur­eless words.  Core words are full of cultural connotations, if not unique prototypical representations.  In Japanese, core words like zabut­on (a cushion used on bamboo-mesh floors as a chair) or yãnomi (a Japanese teacup) are full of societal connotations.  Zabuton are used in traditional ceremonies, old country homes, formal social visits, among other cultural functions.  Yãnomi are traditionally used for drinking Japanese green tea only, while other teas are served in western style kappu (from the English "cup").  These are only a few examples of how even basic lexical meaning is first affected by cultural views.  Carter and others run the risk of making brittle theories about lexis that are not flexible enough to deal with the twists of reality.

 

Some would hold that lexical items are too fluid and diverse to discover any extension of the dominant culture's views.  Cultural attitudes, they claim, are always in a state of flux, and there is no unanimous official societal view on anything.  They point out that the connotation of a word changes frequently, especially with regards to euphemisms.  For example, the word "gay" in English has changed from a synonym of "happy" to that of "homo­sexual".  While North American culture continues to struggle with the issue of homosexuality, and few would agree that all homosex­uals are inherently happy, nor that the subject is necessarily joyous.  "Gavac­ho", once used in Spanish as a pejorative term for a man who was influenced by French culture, is used in Mexico today to negatively describe white American males.   

 

People ascribing to this view also cite many examples of diverse connotations of words and variety of "anti-languages" (see Halliday, 1978) found within subcultures, which they assert are just as valid.  In the dominant North American culture, "bitch" is a negative term, yet can be a term of affec­tion between inti­mate friends in the African American community.  Pendejo is a contemptuous term used throughout Latin and South America, yet is a word expressing companionship in Costa Rica.  While it is true that connotation and euphemism can be notori­ously misleading, a danger of this view is that one can fall into a relativistic frame of mind stating that since nothing can be com­pletely known, any discus­sion on lexis and culture is point­less.  We are then left to discarding common sense, doubting the obvious and enduring the mental gymnastics of explanations on lexicon that, while highly creative, are absurd.

 

4.1  A Possible Solution

Let us assume that, considering the inability of the structuralists to validate their views on lexis, dominant cul­tural views, rather than the words themselves, affect the conno­tation of lexical meaning.  In what way would it be influ­enced?  Our point of departure­ begins with viewing words and lexical items as cultural prototypes.  Aitchison (1995) argues that the source of prototypes is often something of high cultural value, and

 

"...represent internal theories.  People construct mental models for themselves in order to handle their lives and everything in them.  These models are an inextricable mix­ture of acute observation, cultural brainwashing, fragments of memory and a dollop of imagi­nation.  They embody a per­son's assumptions about the world, including naïve beliefs as to how it works, some learned, some invented" (p. 68).

 

­What I am suggesting is that we can extend Aitchison's reasoning to the next logical step: that prototypes are not only for indi­vidual mental models, but also for the culture at large.  A culture's particular world view is expressed­ though lexical choices, but is not held prisoner to the lexis used.  We will see later as we look at metaphors, idioms and proverbial phrases that lexical items represent the theories, values and observations of the dominant culture, but not in any con­crete, empirical way that would be satisfying to those seeking hard data.  Aitchi­son (1995­:69) notes that individual proto­ty­pical mental models can be fixed or temporary; the temporary ones being the subject of sudden, complex and often illogical innovations.  In the same way, lexis and its connotation can be fixed or temporary for a society, while still maintaining an ab­stract repre­sentation of what the society be­lieves should be, but not necessar­ily is, reality.

 

If the prototype theory can be extended from the individual to the level of culture, this would help to explain subcult­ural variations in lexical connotation.  As the illustration (see Figure 2) shows, the dominant culture's lexical understanding is the focal point, while subcul­tural connotations and anti-lan­guages would polysemically cluster around the central meaning.  The dominant cul­ture's connotation in this way remains the foun­dation for the subculture and also the individual's use of a lexical item.

 

4.2  Shadows of a Culture

Metaphorically speaking, words are like the shadows of a society.  They are not the society in themselves, but reveal the cognitive shape of that culture in an abstract sort of way.  Shadows are best studied and defined from afar.  When lexical items are studied dispassionately and disconnected from the actual culture, one can say something of the form of a culture's shifting mental models.  This can be done, however, only in a very general sort of way. The closer one ap­proaches a shadow, the  edges will blur until eventually one is enveloped in the shadow and no longer an observer.  Similarly, the more one attempts to detail and define societal views encoded in lexical items, the more inexplicable meaning and connotation become.  Contradictions arise and confus­ion sets in.  Proto­types, like the cultures they represent, are enig­matic.  As Aitchison (1995) states, "The more closely proto­types are examined, the more elusive they seem to be" (p. 64).

 

4.3  Survey of Spanish and Japanese

It seems then that we can learn something of the societal views encoded in a word, but only in a very rough sense.  We will now go on to look at some examples of Japanese and Spanish to see if any general societal prototypes can be lifted from the lexical items.  One excellent source for exploring cultural attitudes is through the metaphor of idioms and proverbs.  Altho­ugh these are made up of multi-word units, McCarthy (1994) gives many instances of how multi-word units, idioms, binomials/trinomials (" . . . pairs and trios of words which display fixed membership and sequence" (p. 8)) and metaphors should be treated as single lexical items.   

 

Looking at Spanish idioms, we can see a culture that has been deeply influenced by Christianity.  Hablar en crist­iano (liter­ally:  to speak Christian) means "to talk plain Spanish".  En un decir Jesús (before you can say "Jesus") means "in an in­stant".  Mas falso que Judas (falser than Judas) is a common saying about people who are two-faced.  We can find a strong fatalistic vein in their common idiomatic references to God:  a la buena de Dios (literally:  by God's goodness) means something done just any old way, to fall as it will.  Como Dios manda (literally:  as God commands) means to do something the way one is supposed to be done.  Estar de Dios (Literally:  to be of God) means to be fated, to be meant to be.  Sabe Dios (God knows), is a very common idiom, meaning that there is no telling what will happen.  The North American idiom, "To let the fox in the chicken coop" finds its humorous counterpart in these predominantly Roman Catholic cultures:  Dejar la iglesia en las manos de Lutero -- "to leave the church in Luther's hands"! 

 

Japanese idioms and proverbs are also illuminating.  There is the classic expression:  Deru kugi wa utareru (the nail which sticks up will be hammered) which is often told to middle school stu­dents as a warning not to become too individualistic or outstanding in any way as to draw attention to oneself and away from the group.  Chinmoku wa kin "silence is gold", valuing suppression of self-expression over speaking one's mind.  Nou aru taka wa tsume o kakusu (skill­ful hawks hide their talons) is often said about people who modestly hide a great talent.  Con­cepts such as mono no aware (the Japanese view of the transi­ence and melancholy beauty in all life which is here today and gone tomorrow) are ex­pressed in sayings such as rakka eda ni kaerazu, hakyou futatabi terasazu, meaning, "fallen blossoms do not return to branches; a broken mirror does not reflect again".  Some have universal appeal like Naku ko to jito ni wa katenu:  "You can't win with crying children and bureaucrats".  Such metaphorical expressions are telling a very common fatalistic strain often heard in Japanese conversation:  Life is often unfair, and there's nothing we can do about it.

 

Again, it must be emphasized that such lexical items are only prototypes of what a culture feels should be valued.  While the connotations of these prototypes are definitely encoded in the lexis, we must remember that many agnostic Spaniards use idioms replete with Christian meaning with no thought as to the signifi­cance of what they are saying.  Nails stick up in Japan (though usually in groups), some hawks show their claws, and very rarel­y, someone gets their way with a bureaucrat!    

5.0  Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show that lexis and culture are not bound and determined, and speakers are much freer than they often realize in terms of lexical expression.  Lexis grows as the culture grows, not the other way around.  Cultural views are encoded into lexis but are not encoded by lexis.  These societal values can be identified only in a vague, prototypical way.  The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is just that -- a hypothesis.   It is a relic of the past when the world was still a big place, and our understanding of psycholinguistics was much less defined.  As inert as a preserved specimen in a jar, the Sapir-Whorf hypothe­sis has contributed to a stagnation in psycholinguistic thinking.  As we approach the 21st century, we need to be open to new psycholinguistic paradigms, such as those found in the model of cultural prototypes.  Those who do not only will remain on the cutting edge for years to come, but they will also participate in vital process of future psycholin­guist­ic innovation.   

 

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